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I.

LIVING WITH THE BLUE RASH
[Today, t]he land ownership map of the West in many places resembles a
crazy quilt, without reason or coherent pattern. . . . [O]ften no single
owner (states, private entities, or the Federal government) owns enough
contiguous land to allow effective management of land holdings, . . . [and]
fragmented ownership patterns generate a plethora of disputes over
access and similar problems.1
Figure 1.
Land Ownership in Southeastern Utah

Source: Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration.

Mapping conventions dictate that state trust lands are shown in blue, and the
prevalence of blue state sections found on land ownership mapping results in what has
been referred to as a “blue rash.”2 Figure 1 shows Southeastern Utah and the pervasive
nature of state trust lands.
The bright green areas in Figure 1 represent Wilderness Study Areas (WSAs).
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which manages the WSAs, is obligated to
ensure that activities within WSAs do “not impair the suitability of such areas for
preservation as wilderness.”3 Road construction or surface disturbing development is
prohibited within Wilderness Areas, effectively precluding such development within
WSAs.4 This preservation mandate invites conflict because as discussed in more detail
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below, the Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA), which
manages state trust lands within Utah, is obligated to optimize revenue from these lands
to support public schools and institutions.5 The scope of the conflict is vast – 96,000
SITLA managed acres are within Wilderness Study Areas, 6 and the Red Rocks
Wilderness bill 7 would capture 817,000 acres of SITLA surface estate within newly
created Wilderness Areas.8
While this paper focuses on examples from Utah, the challenges posed by a
fragmented landscape and conflicting management objectives are much broader. Across
the 11 contiguous Western states, state trust lands account for twice the acreage of
National Parks and trust lands are often interspersed with protected or sensitive lands.
Inholdings within National Forests, for example, total 14.3 million acres.9 While many
inholdings are owned by private parties rather than state trust land agencies, the fact
that National Forest inholdings in the 11 contiguous Western states account for more
land than all of Maryland and Vermont combined indicates the scope of the problem.
A.

FRAGMENTATION

Across the 11 contiguous Western states, the federal government controls 362
million acres (565,400 mi2) of land surface. The BLM is the largest single landowner and
oversees 172 million surface acres (268,700 mi2) and an even larger mineral estate.10
The U.S. Forest Service controls 142.4 million acres (222,500 mi2) of land surface.11
These federal lands are shown in Figure 2 and summarized in Table 1. State trust lands
are often interspersed, as can be seen in Figure 1.
Figure 2.
Federal Public Lands

Source: U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management.
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Table 1.
Land Ownership in Acres (2012)

Arizona
California
Colorado
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
Oregon
Utah
Washington
Wyoming
TOTAL

State Trust
Lands
9,033,939
304,960
2,693,222
2,431,819
5,150,294
8,225
8,871,722
1,414,160
3,341,552
3,595,925
3,551,106
40,396,924

USFS

BLM

NPS

10,887,147
20,620,161
14,419,327
20,367,277
18,515,274
5,775,523
9,298,320
16,371,134
8,064,101
9,107,632
8,992,007
142,417,903

12,333,412
15,577,435
8,286,845
12,290,691
6,517,197
47,595,668
13,428,855
15,729,365
22,870,057
190,446
17,171,830
171,991,801

2,587,116
7,717,178
664,013
127,937
1,257,973
763,978
382,714
197,384
2,116,707
1,951,798
2,330,976
20,097,774

Total State
Area
72,864,243
100,387,592
66,015,890
53,333,686
92,306,919
70,750,381
77,761,778
61,930,355
54,196,778
42,983,504
62,237,548
754,768,674

Source: Headwaters Economics.

State trust lands administrators manage 40.4 million acres (63,100 mi2) of
surface estate across the same landscape.12 In Utah, for example, SITLA manages 3.3
million acres — a land area larger than Connecticut13 but scattered across the landscape
in 9,249 individual parcels. 14 Fragmentation and conflicting management objectives
invite conflict, especially when preservation and development mandates collide. In
Montana, for example, 1.2 million of the state’s 5.1 million acres of state trust lands are
land-locked by federal and private lands.15
1.

How We Got Here

Developing a path out of the quagmire requires an understanding of how we
came to live in such a fragmented landscape. The short answer is that the federal
government acquired what is now the “West” through conquest or purchase; treaties
were signed, federal territories were established, and territories eventually became the
states that we know today. Railroads, miners, settlers, and newly admitted states were
granted lands in order to support settlement, development, or essential government
programs. Under laws intended to dispose of public lands, the federal government
conveyed vast tracts of federal public lands to corporations and private individuals:
approximately 270.2 million acres (422,200 mi2) to homesteaders;16 roughly 94.4 million
acres (147,400 mi2) to railroads;17 about 70.9 million acres (110,700 mi2) to mineral
claimants,18 and by 1907, approximately 68.2 million acres (106,600 mi2) to returning
veterans. 19 Grants to homesteaders, railroads, miners, and veterans were scattered
across the landscape, reflecting claimant interest rather than orderly disposition.
The federal government also granted extensive lands to newly admitted states,
though the formula for disposal varied from state to state.20 Under the public land survey
system, public lands are divided into townships, each of which contains 36 sections;
each section is normally one square-mile in size (640 acres).21 Townships and sections
form an invisible grid over the landscape, as shown in Figure 3. Upon admission to the
Union, Utah received the right to title to sections 2, 16, 32, and 36.22 Lands granted to
the states were scattered across the landscape to ensure a representative sample of
resources were available to support state institutions, and to create an incentive to
develop all parts of the state. Lands that were not granted away remain in federal
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ownership. The result is the patchwork of ownership evident in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 3.
Public Land Survey System
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Source: Wallace Stegner Center for Land, Resources, and the Environment.

Laws disposing of federal lands and resources, created in an era when the
federal government was land-rich but cash poor,23 set a course for western public land
management that is often difficult to reconcile with evolving social priorities. Much of the
tension can be traced to a belief in manifest destiny and reconstruction era laws that
ushered in westward expansion and dramatic economic growth.24 Their imprint remains
evident today, and the path these laws charted for a youthful nation is sometimes fraught
with tension because of evolving realities and changing national priorities.
Fragmented ownership would matter little if all landowners and managers
operated under similar objectives and could harmonize their efforts. Objectives,
however, are often in conflict.
B.

CONFLICTING MANDATES

SITLA, like other states’ trust lands administrators, is obligated to manage trust
lands in the most “prudent and profitable manner possible” to support public schools and
institutions.25 Specifically, SITLA is directed to “obtain the optimum values from use of
4

trust lands and revenues for the trust beneficiaries, including the return of not less than
fair market value for the use, sale, or exchange of school and institutional trust assets.”26
In contrast to SITLA, the BLM operates under a multiple-use, sustained-yield mandate
that includes protecting sensitive lands.27 BLM’s holdings include 22,870,057 acres in
Utah, or roughly 42% of the entire state.28
Optimizing revenues for trust beneficiaries can be a challenge, as 96,000 SITLA
acres are within Wilderness Study Areas,29 which are managed under a non-impairment
standard that precludes most commercial uses.30 An additional 20,220 acres are within
either the Beaver Dam Wash or Red Cliffs National Conservation Areas, which are
managed, in part, “to conserve, protect, and enhance for the benefit and enjoyment of
present and future generations the ecological, scenic, wildlife, recreational, cultural,
historical, natural, educational, and scientific resources of the National Conservation
Area.” 31 Other federal lands, such as Areas of Critical Environmental Concern,32 are
often incompatible with resource development and surround many more SITLA acres.
Preservation proposals threaten to capture even more SITLA land, the most profound
example being the Red Rocks Wilderness bill,33 which would capture 817,000 acres of
SITLA surface estate within newly created Wilderness Areas.34 The proposed Greater
Canyonlands National Monument would capture 151,230 acres of SITLA lands35 and
significant portions of oil and gas fields that, during 2012, produced over 350,000 barrels
of oil and 185 million cubic feet of natural gas. 36 The more modest Canyonlands
Completion proposal, which has received much broader support, would still capture
almost 31,000 acres of SITLA lands.37
State trust land inholdings within sensitive federal public lands is a pervasive
problem across the 11 contiguous Western states. State trust land inholdings are found
in BLM managed National Monuments in Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, and New
Mexico, where inholdings collectively total 197,713 acres.38 In addition to Utah, state
trust land inholdings are found in BLM managed National Conservation Areas in Arizona
and Idaho, where inholdings total 46,662 acres. 39 While inholdings within National
Forests are not broken out by ownership type, inholdings are found in National Forest
Service managed Wilderness areas in each of the 11 contiguous Western states, where
they total 92,479 acres.40 All told, inholdings in National Forest Service managed lands
that are managed under a conservation designation total 416,615 acres (651 mi2) across
this same landscape.41 The inability to both conserve and optimize revenue generation
from the same landscape invites conflict.
C.

THE ECONOMIC AND ECOLOGICAL COSTS OF FRAGMENTATION

The scattered nature of many state trust land parcels increases management
costs and impacts development potential. For example, developing a SITLA parcel that
is surrounded by federal land necessitates obtaining access across surrounding federal
land. While SITLA and its lessees are entitled to reasonable access across federal
lands, the federal government is also able to impose reasonable regulation on access in
order to minimize impacts to resources. 42 Striking a balance between access and
protection of competing resource values involves complex discretionary decisions on the
part of the BLM. These decisions almost assuredly represent “major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment”43 and therefore trigger the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 44 The NEPA compliance process often
necessitates preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement and costs both time and
money. Furthermore, at 640 acres, many state trust land parcels are too small to
develop economically unless they are part of a larger development that includes
surrounding BLM lands. Where the BLM does not choose to pursue development, trust
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land beneficiaries may be unable to realize the full economic value of trust assets.
The ecological values at stake are equally compelling, including some of the
most dramatic and ecologically significant lands in the West. The development that trust
land managers are charged with pursuing threatens Wilderness Study Areas, Areas of
Critical Environmental Concern, and other sensitive landscapes. Development threatens
to fragment large blocks of habitat, many of which provide habitat for species protected
under the Endangered Species Act. 45 Fragmentation could also negatively impact
habitat connectivity for large mammals that disperse over a broad geographic range.46
Protecting and increasing landscape-scale connectivity is one of the most common
recommendations for protecting biodiversity in the face of climate change. 47 As the
National Fish, Wildlife and Plants Climate Adaptation Partnership notes, the ability to
“[c]onserve, restore, and as appropriate and practicable, establish new ecological
connections among conservation areas to facilitate fish, wildlife, and plant migration,
range shifts, and other transitions caused by climate change” is a key adaptation
strategy.48 Land exchanges are specifically identified as a primary means to affect that
end.49
Consolidating state ownership would facilitate improved planning and leasing for
revenue-generating economic uses of state trust lands. Consolidating important
conservation lands would facilitate new protective designations and management
prescriptions that are often associated with economic growth in adjacent communities.50
II.

LAND EXCHANGES

Land exchanges have proven useful in “rationalizing” land ownership and
management.51 While sometimes controversial, land exchanges appear to provide the
single best opportunity for rationalizing ownership and control over public lands and the
resources they contain. The transformed landscape could simultaneously facilitate both
responsible energy development and conservation of sensitive landscapes.
The BLM’s land exchange authority is contained in the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA) sections 205 and 206, which set forth the BLM’s authority to
acquire and dispose of public lands.52 The two key requirements for a FLPMA exchange
involve determinations that the parcels to be exchanged are of equal value, and that the
exchange is in the public interest. Congress can bypass FLPMA, enacting legislation
specifically authorizing a land exchange and exempting the exchange from one or more
of FLPMA’s requirements, but practical and political realities, as well as past legislative
exchanges, indicate that some assurance of equal value and public interest will still be
required. While the fragmentation-reducing benefits of land exchanges are clear, the
complexities and high transaction costs foil most efforts.
A.

KEY REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL-STATE LAND EXCHANGES
1.

Equal Value

Under FLPMA, exchanged lands must be in the same state and of equal value,53
based on nationally approved appraisal standards.54 The appraisal must set forth an
opinion regarding the market value of the lands. “In estimating market value, the
appraiser shall: (1) Determine the highest and best use of the property to be appraised;”
and “(2) Estimate the value of the lands and interests as if in private ownership and
available for sale in the open market.”55 “Highest and best use means the most probable
legal use of a property, based on market evidence as of the date of valuation, expressed
in an appraiser's supported opinion.” 56 In order to equalize the value of parcels
exchanged, the exchange may incorporate cash payments for up to 25% of the values of
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the federal lands and interests exchanged.57 Land exchanges under FLPMA can involve
the surface estate, mineral interests, or both.58
Equal value determinations necessitate formal appraisals, which are
impracticable for consolidating exchanges involving hundreds of parcels and thousands
of acres. Furthermore, highest and best use determinations do not adequately capture
nonmarket values: “[a] noneconomic highest and best use, such as conservation, natural
lands, preservation, or any use that requires the property to be withheld from economic
production in perpetuity, is not a valid use upon which to estimate market value.”59 This
prohibition proves especially problematic where federal agencies seek to acquire
inholdings to advance conservation objectives.
The appraisal’s market analysis becomes even more complicated for mineral
bearing parcels. For such parcels, the analysis must consider the physical
characteristics of the minerals and the land; the demand for and marketability of the
minerals, including the access to markets and transportation costs, price, and
competition; production volume, including rate, production lifespan, and costs;
environmental considerations including permitting and reclamation costs; taxes, royalty
rates, capitalization, discount rates, foreseeable technology advances, and a host of
other considerations that may necessitate complex assessments or development of
formal mining plans.60 As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals observed: “Many of these
factors are impossible to predict with reasonable accuracy.”61 And mineral appraisals
may be needed for literally hundreds of separate parcels. Questionable accuracy and
high transaction costs, coupled with the risk of litigation, stop most consolidating
exchange efforts before they begin.
Finally, appraisals represent value estimations at a fixed moment in time, while
the market conditions upon which appraisals depend are subject to constant change.
The validity period for most appraisals is generally between six months to one year,
depending on market conditions in the project area. The time required to process an
exchange varies with workload and exchange complexity, and extended processing
times can cause the appraisal validity to be called into question. This may create an
incentive to advance smaller, less complicated exchange proposals rather than the kinds
of large proposals that would have the greatest benefit.
In the face of the challenges involved in consummating consolidating federalstate exchanges under FLPMA, many exchanges seek congressional authorization.62
While a legislative exchange can be drafted to avoid many of FLPMA’s requirements,
and most large exchanges proceed legislatively for just this reason, equal value
requirements remain a practical reality even where FLPMA does not apply. Legislators
normally want at least some assurance that the exchange is fair. Common compromises
are legislative language authorizing less complex valuation methods, applying less
stringent value equalization requirements, or including a determination that exchanges
involve lands of equal or approximately equal value.63
Alternatively, congressionally authorized exchanges can incorporate revenue
sharing provisions that reduce the need for formal mineral appraisals. This approach
shifts the emphasis from putting a precise value on the lands to be conveyed towards
ensuring that all parties receive a fair share of whatever revenue may eventually be
generated. Under the Utah Recreational Land Exchange (URLE), for example, the U.S.
reserved half of any rent and bonus bids as well as a “royalty in the amount that would
have been received by the Federal Government if the oil shale resources had been
retained in Federal ownership.”64 The decision to apply revenue sharing only to oil shale
resources proved to be problematic because the region also contains significant
quantities of natural gas. Appraisals were needed for conventional hydrocarbon
resources, and as discussed in more detail below, fluctuations in the price of natural gas
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reduced the value of the land to be conveyed to the state, forcing major revisions to the
exchange.
Pending legislation that would authorize the relinquishment of state trust lands
within the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation and the selection of federal public lands
to replace the lands relinquished extends revenue sharing to all minerals subject to the
federal Mineral Leasing Act.65 Whether an expanded use of revenue sharing represents
a viable model remains to be seen. While uncertainty remains, revenue sharing appears
to represent a powerful tool in the effort to minimize transaction costs while ensuring fair
outcomes to all parties.
2.

Public Interest

FLPMA requires that exchanges be in the public interest. Like land valuation and
equalization requirements, a public interest determination is also a practical necessity for
legislative exchanges. Under FLPMA, the Secretary must determine that “the public
interest will be served by making the exchange.”66 FLPMA’s implementing regulations
require a determination that an exchange serves the public interest be predicated on a
finding that:
(1) The resource values and the public objectives that the Federal lands
or interests to be conveyed may serve if retained in Federal ownership
are not more than the resource values of the non-Federal lands or
interests and the public objectives they could serve if acquired, and (2)
The intended use of the conveyed Federal lands will not, in the
determination of the authorized officer, significantly conflict with
established management objectives on adjacent Federal lands and Indian
trust lands. Such finding and the supporting rationale shall be made part
of the administrative record.67
At a conceptual level, demonstrating that an exchange is in the public interest
appears fairly straightforward for consolidating federal-state exchanges because of the
clear benefits that stand to accrue to each party.68 This argument flows from the BLM’s
regulations, which state that:
When considering the public interest, the authorized officer shall give full
consideration to the opportunity to achieve better management of Federal
lands and resources, to meet the needs of State and local residents and
their economies, and to secure important objectives, including but not
limited to: protection of fish and wildlife habitats, cultural resources,
watersheds, and wilderness and aesthetic values; enhancement of
recreation opportunities and public access; consolidation of lands and/or
interests in lands, such as mineral and timber interests, for more logical
and efficient management and development; consolidation of split
estates; expansion of communities; accommodation of existing or
planned land use authorizations (§ 254.4(c)(4)); promotion of multiple-use
values; implementation of applicable Forest Land and Resource
Management Plans; and fulfillment of public needs.69
Exchanges that facilitate both sensitive area protection and responsible
development appear to advance these goals. Conceptual ease, however, is complicated
by the time and effort required to document consideration of all the factors reflected in
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applicable regulations. For a FLPMA exchange, the determination is often integrated into
the NEPA analysis for the proposed exchange. The NEPA documents and public
interest determination must also consider other legal requirements, such as compliance
with the Endangered Species Act and the National Historic Preservation Act, that can
involve considerable time and expense. Furthermore, the identification, valuation, and
balancing of the resource values associated with the parcels to be acquired and
conveyed can increase NEPA document complexity, and with it, the time and expense
required to conclude the public interest determination.
When Congress weighs in on a federal-state land exchange, Congress often
includes a determination that the exchange is in the public interest.70 A congressional
determination does not, however, eliminate requirements to comply with substantive and
procedural requirements contained in statutes such as the Endangered Species Act and
the National Historic Preservation Act. A congressional public interest determination,
while potentially expediting an exchange, may also reduce opportunities for public
involvement. And of course public interest determinations may be met with skepticism,
especially where there has been a history of disproportionate windfalls to one party.71
Calls for a formal presumption that consolidating federal-state land exchanges
are in the public interest respond, at least in part, to the subjectivity inherent in the
determination.72 Whether improvements in efficiency outweigh the benefits resulting from
careful and transparent deliberation is an open question, and likely to generate strong
opinions by all parties. At present, the requirements associated with the public interest
determination appear less problematic than the requirements associated with the equal
value determination, but these requirements are still likely to result in significant time and
expense to the parties involved.
B.

ADDITIONAL BARRIERS TO SUCCESSFUL FEDERAL-STATE EXCHANGES

Federal-state land exchanges that consolidate lands and reduce fragmentation
can simultaneously facilitate both responsible resource development and protection of
sensitive landscapes. Despite the clear benefit to a wide range of interests, such
exchanges remain rare. Having already discussed the transaction costs associated with
land and resource valuation, this section explores other reasons why mutually beneficial
exchanges are so difficult to effectuate.
1.

Resource Values

Oil and natural gas are the most common mineral resources extracted from
federal and state lands. These resources are sold on commodity markets where prices
fluctuate based on factors beyond the producers’ control. In 1998, for example, West
Texas intermediate crude oil sold for an average annual price of $14.42 per barrel; a
decade later, the price had increased almost 700% to $99.67 per barrel.73 Natural gas
markets are equally volatile, with the average annual wellhead price hitting $7.97 per
thousand cubic feet in 2008 but falling to $2.66 per thousand cubic feet in 2012.74 See
Figure 4.
Market volatility can directly impact land and resource value, as it did with the
Utah Recreational Land Exchange Act. The Act authorized the BLM to convey 35,609
acres of developable public land to Utah in return for 45,826 acres of sensitive state
lands located near National Parks and along the Colorado River. 75 The initial
authorization was subject to modification as needed to equalize the value of the lands
exchanged. Appraisals and exchange documentation took four and a half years, and
between the Act’s passage and exchange consummation, the price of natural gas fell
precipitously, reducing the value of the federal lands to be conveyed to the State by
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more than $10 million. To ensure an equal value exchange, 36 state parcels totaling
20,273 acres were dropped from the exchange and will not receive the federal
protections that all parties initially envisioned.76
Figure 4.
Domestic Oil and Gas Market Prices 1990-2012

Data from the United States Energy Information Administration.

Changes in technology can also frustrate value equalization efforts. The
combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing has enabled the energy
industry to access and produce oil and natural gas much more economically, lowering
the per-unit cost of production while making previously unprofitable reserves
economically recoverable. Such changes can radically impact the value of mineral
resources underlying state and federal lands, playing havoc with efforts to equalize
values.
Unconventional resources such as oil shale are even more troubling. For
example, a 2010 U.S. Geological Survey report estimated in-place oil shale resources of
the Green River Formation within the Uinta Basin of Utah and Colorado at over 1.3
trillion barrels.77 To put that into perspective, Saudi Arabia has approximately 265 billion
barrels of proven oil reserves.78 At almost 5 times the size of Saudi Arabia’s proven
reserves, the potential resources within the Green River Formation are staggering.
However, commercial scale oil shale to liquid fuel production does not exist anywhere in
the world. To value oil shale bearing lands based on the oil equivalency of in-place
resources ignores the unknown cost of production and uncertain rate of recovery,
potentially dramatically overstating the economic value of the resource. However, simply
assuming that since oil shale will never be produced commercially because it has not
been profitably developed to date risks dramatic underestimation of economic value.
Inaccurate assumptions could create huge winners and losers, and the risk of loss
resulting from faulty assumptions stands as a major barrier to successful exchanges.
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While it is unrealistic to expect that market and technological uncertainty can be
eliminated, reducing uncertainty can help minimize transaction costs and the risk to all
parties. Minimizing the likelihood that appraisals will require revision or that NEPA
documents will need supplementation reduces the likelihood that the time and expense
incurred completing these steps will inhibit mutually beneficial exchange efforts.
Likewise, since the risk of entering into an exchange that subsequently results in a
windfall to one party is a strong psychological barrier to exchange finalization, minimizing
this risk may facilitate progress towards exchange consummation. Revenue sharing
provisions may be a means of addressing some of these challenges.
2.

Existing Revenue Distributions

Environmental matters aside, a land exchange involving federal and state trust
lands at first appears to be a simple matter of ascertaining the value of the lands
involved, and then ensuring that the lands conveyed by the federal government to the
trust lands administration are equal in value to the lands conveyed by the trust lands
administration to the federal government. It is not that simple.
Under the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA),79 states are entitled to roughly half of the
revenue from mineral development occurring on federal lands,80 and mineral revenue
payments to states are “directed giving priority to those subdivisions of the State socially
or economically impacted by development of minerals . . . for (i) planning, (ii)
construction and maintenance of public facilities, and (iii) provision of public services.”81
The equal value federal-trust lands exchange shown in Figure 5 therefore affects
interests in future revenue depicted in Figure 6.
Figure 5.
Simple Federal-Trust Lands Exchange

Source: Wallace Stegner Center for Land, Resources, and the Environment.

Figure 6.
Revenue Distribution for Federal-Trust Lands Exchanges

Source: Wallace Stegner Center for Land, Resources, and the Environment.

An equal value federal-state exchange would pose little difficulty if both parcels
have the same likelihood of development. A problem arises when the federal
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government seeks to obtain lands for conservation purposes, and these lands contain
valuable mineral resources that would likely have been developed had the land
remained in state ownership. Such scenarios are common because the threat of
developing a mineral-rich trust lands parcel, deemed better suited for conservation or
surrounded by federal lands managed for conservation purposes, motivates most federal
acquisitions. While the federal government may be willing to forego potential future
revenue in return for conservation benefits, that decision impacts a potential source of
future revenue for local governments. The loss of that potential revenue stream will
invariably raise a concern for the communities that will face the shortfall. Of course the
income forgone is speculative revenue since there are no guarantees that the parcel
would have been developed, but it is likely to raise concerns all the same.
At this point it is worth noting that the federal government is under no obligation
to retain land in federal ownership.82 If the federal government chose to dispose of public
lands through sale or grant, no MLA revenue from development occurring after federal
disposal would accrue to either the state or local governments. 83 Accordingly, as a
purely legal matter, the federal government is likely free to exchange federal lands
without regard to the impact on MLA revenue. However, as a practical matter, an
exchange that reduces the potential for future federal mineral revenue production, half of
which is directed to local governments, may founder for lack of local support.
In addition to questions regarding the amount of MLA revenue that would be
directed to local governments, federal-state exchanges raise difficult questions regarding
how MLA revenue would be distributed among those governments. Since mineral
revenue derived from federal land development is returned to the counties where the
development occurred, an exchange that shifts development from one county to another
also shifts revenue between counties, even if the exchange does not result in a change
in the net amount of revenue produced. Again, counties that suspect they will loose
future revenue as a result of a federal-state exchange are likely to be exchange skeptics.
There are several ways to protect the potential state revenue stream, but all are
problematic. As a practical matter, a federal-state land exchange is unlikely to succeed
unless it is fair to all parties involved – that is, no party can give up more than it receives.
State and local governments also are unlikely to support exchanges that eliminate their
potential to receive a share of the revenue generated from mineral development on
federal lands within the county’s borders, effectively requiring either an increased
contribution from trust lands administrators or the federal government.
The federal government cannot provide additional value because to do so would
violate FLPMA’s equal value requirement.84 While legislative exchanges are likely to
include less rigid equal value requirements, the perception that the federal government
fails to obtain a fair return will almost certainly generate strong public opposition to
legislation giving more than equal value to states.85
Provision of additional value by state trust land managers is equally problematic.
In Utah, state trust lands administrators owe a fiduciary duty to trust beneficiaries,
obligating them to “manage the lands and revenues generated from the lands in the
most prudent and profitable manner possible.”86 “Trust lands administrators must be
concerned with both income for current beneficiaries and the preservation of trust assets
for future beneficiaries, which requires a balancing of short and long-term interests so
that long-term benefits are not lost in the effort to maximize short-term gains.”87 The
precise requirements of the duty vary from state to state depending on the language
contained in the federal enabling acts offering land upon admission to the Union, state
constitutions accepting federal grants, and state statutes regarding trust lands
administration. 88 Subtle difference aside, the common thread is that trust lands
administrators cannot give up valuable trust assets without obtaining fair market value in
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return.89 Therefore, if state trust lands administrators choose to give up value in order to
ensure that state and local governments maintain a source of revenue, the trust lands
administrators would be in breach of their fiduciary duties and the exchange would be in
legal jeopardy.
The state and its subdivisions could agree to a reduction in potential revenue in
order to maintain exchange viability. Reducing landscape fragmentation will likely
produce new economic opportunities, and increases in tax revenue attributed to new
activity may offset some or all of the potential mineral revenue foregone. However, while
some reduction seems reasonable, it is unlikely that either the legislature or local
governments will agree to a federal-state exchange that they perceive to be
economically unadvantageous.
While fuller consideration of environmental values appears appropriate and
desirable, 90 existing legal requirements preclude non-market value consideration. 91
Therefore, to be fair to all, the parties must agree to discount the value of the lands and
resources to reflect the likelihood of development. For example, where state trust lands
containing valuable mineral resources are surrounded by federal lands that are
managed to protect scenic or wilderness related values, the smaller size of trust lands
parcels and the management requirements associated with surrounding federal lands
may reduce the likelihood of development. The question becomes how much to discount
the value of trust lands by. Subjectivity in these determinations may create some room
for flexibility in equal value negotiations.
Another option is to include other valuable consideration in the exchange. Such
consideration could create flexibility if the parties are afforded deference to the value
they attach to it. For example, the State of Utah and the federal government
consummated one of the largest exchanges ever in 1998, eliminating over 452,000
acres of state trust lands inholdings from National Parks, National Forests, Indian
Reservations, and the newly created Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument.92
In return, the state received a $50,000,000 cash payment, a $13,000,000 interest in coal
revenue from development on federal lands, 156 million tons of coal, and over 117,000
acres of federal land.93 The State of Utah, as part of the exchange agreement, also
agreed to seek dismissal of an ongoing lawsuit over valuation of parcels contained in a
prior land exchange bill.94 The value attached to the litigation foregone is somewhat
subjective, and a similar agreement to drop ongoing litigation in association with an
exchange agreement may provide valuable flexibility to future exchange efforts.
3.

Continuing Claims to Federal Lands

Assuming that the federal and state governments are successful in negotiating
an exchange that consolidates a block of federal land that can then be managed for
conservation purposes, any outstanding mechanism that can fragment that newly
consolidated landscape, whether real or perceived, threatens exchange completion. The
continued existence of non-federal inholdings can pose such a threat. For purposes of
this analysis, we assume that private inholdings can be eliminated through federalprivate exchanges. We also assume that all existing state and state trust lands
inholdings are removed as part of the exchange. While this appears to resolve the
problem, the continued existence of unclaimed “quantity grants” could cause uncertainty
and generate resistance within federal agencies, if such grants are not understood.
When the Western states were admitted to the Union, they received the right to
title to designated sections of land within each township. In Utah’s case, the newly
created state received sections 2, 16, 32, and 36 in each township.95 We refer to these
as section grants. Utah, like its sister states, also received the right to select hundreds of
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thousands of acres in support of specific objectives such as to fund construction of the
State Capitol.96 We refer to these as quantity grants. The right of selection for quantity
grants was established without restriction or regard to the value of the lands selected,
though mineral lands are excluded from selection.97 While most quantity grants were
selected many years ago, SITLA retains approximately 2,800 to 5,000 acres of as of yet
unselected quantity grants; the quantity is in dispute. Because quantity grants are not
tied to value, SITLA has a strong incentive to claim lands with the highest value lands
possible. SITLA will therefore likely claim lands only near urban areas where land values
are generally higher. SITLA has little incentive to seek inholdings within areas otherwise
managed for conservation purposes.
A similar though less pressing concern exists with respect to in-lieu lands. These
are lands that state trust lands administrators are entitled to select in-lieu of section
grants that had been conveyed out of federal ownership before they could be conveyed
to the state.98 In-lieu land selection is intended to “make the States whole for the loss of
value resulting from the unavailability of the originally designated cross section of lands
within the State.” 99 Accordingly, mineral lands are generally unavailable for in-lieu
selection except as indemnity for mineral lands that would have been conveyed to the
state but for prior reservation or conveyance to a third party.100 Similarly, the Secretary of
the Interior can classify lands as available for in-lieu selection in order to avoid selection
resulting in conveyance of grossly disparate value to the state.101 This limitation appears
to reduce federal concern that a state may seek to acquire disproportionately valuable
lands through in-lieu selection. The administrative process involved in in-lieu selection
also provides federal land managers with increased voice in the selection process,
creating an opportunity to resolve concerns or disagreements that is lacking with respect
to quantity grants.
III.

FUTURE RESEARCH REGARDING POTENTIAL REFORMS

The goal of this paper was to identify opportunities and challenges and begin a
conversation about alternative courses of action. Given the potential for mutually
beneficial federal-state land exchanges, reform opportunities represent a fruitful area for
future research.
As noted earlier, regulations applicable to federal land exchanges preclude
consideration of non-market values. Yet a key motivator behind many large federal-state
land exchanges is the removal of trust lands inholdings from sensitive landscapes,
thereby removing the threat of development and facilitating conservation oriented
management across a broader landscape. Valuation reform allowing consideration of
ecosystem services and non-extractive uses could lead to more complete and accurate
valuation.102
In the face of the challenges involved in concluding consolidating federal-state
exchanges under FLPMA, many exchanges seek congressional authorization.
Legislation can authorize less complex valuation methods or find that exchanges involve
lands that are equal in value. Alternatively, congressionally authorized exchanges can
shift the focus from valuation and equalization to the underlying goal, ensuring that
neither the state nor the federal government is unjustly enriched by the transaction. The
Utah Recreational Land Exchange and Uintah and Ouray Relinquishment and Selection
proposals discussed above are potential models for broader reforms. Future research
should evaluate these efforts to determine whether they produce the intended results
and seek to develop models that improve both efficiency and efficacy.
While revenue sharing provides a valuable tool, especially when the exchange
involves resources that are subject to significant uncertainty or market volatility, revenue
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sharing does not resolve the problems posed by the MLA’s ongoing commitment to
return revenue generated from development on federal lands to the communities where
that development occurred. Utah has created a Land Exchange Distribution Account,103
which directs a percentage of the proceeds from development on lands acquired through
land exchanges back to the counties that lost federal lands as part of that exchange.104
This account and associated statute may provide a useful model for other states.
Regardless of how reform efforts proceed, careful attention should be paid to unintended
changes to revenue distribution, and the consequences such changes portend.
Finally, trust (or the lack thereof) stands as one of the most significant barriers to
exchange efforts. Closing out remaining quantity grants and in-lieu selections as part of
a consolidating federal-state exchange could help secure support for mutually beneficial
exchanges. Public support is especially important, particularly where past exchange
efforts have stalled because of a lack of trust or fears of an inequitable outcome.
Overcoming these challenges will necessitate careful process design, meaningful public
involvement, and transparency.
Despite the challenges ahead, we are optimistic that, with appropriate reforms,
federal-state land exchanges can reduce management fragmentation and conflicts. The
ecological and economic benefits consolidating exchanges justify a concerted reform
effort.
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